by
James Petras
US relations with Venezuela illustrate the specific mechanisms with which an imperial power seeks to sustain client states and overthrow independent nationalist governments. By examining US strategic goals and its tactical measures, we can set forth several propositions about (1) the nature and instruments of imperial politics, (2) the shifting context and contingencies influencing the successes and failures of specific policies, and (3) the importance of regional and global political alignments and priorities.
Method of Analysis
A comparative historical approach
highlights the different policies, contexts and outcomes of imperial
policies during two distinct Presidential periods: the ascendancy of
neo-liberal client regimes (Perez and Caldera) of the late 1980’s to
1998; and the rise and consolidation of a nationalist populist
government under President Chavez (1999-2012). [1]
During the 1980’s and 1990’s, US successes in securing policies favorable to US economic and foreign policy
interests under client rulers fixed, in the mind of Washington, the
optimal and only acceptable model and criteria for responding
(negatively) to the subsequent Chavez nationalist government. [2]
US policy toward Venezuela in the 1990’s and its
successes were part and parcel of a general embrace of neo-liberal
electoral regimes in Latin America. Washington and its allies in the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank
(IDB) promoted and supported regimes throughout Latin America, which
privatized and de-nationalized over five thousand public enterprises in
the most lucrative economic sectors. [3]
These quasi-public monopolies included natural resources, energy,
finance, trade, transport and telecommunications. Neo-liberal client
regimes reversed 50 years of economic and social policy,
concentrated wealth, deregulated the economy, and laid the basis for a
profound crisis, which ultimately discredited neo-liberalism. This led
to continent-wide popular uprisings resulting in regime changes and the
ruse if nationalist populist governments.
The historical-comparative approach allows us to analyze
Washington’s response to the rise and demise of its neo-liberal clients
and the subsequent ascendency of populist-nationalism and how regional
patterns and changes influence the capacity of an imperial power to
intervene and attempt to re-establish its dominance.
Conceptual Framework
The key to understanding the mode and means of imposing
and sustaining imperial dominance is to recognize that Washington
combines multiple forms of struggle, depending on resources, available
collaborators and opportunities and contingencies. [4]
In approaching client regimes, Washington combines military and economic aid
to repress opposition and buttress economic allies by cushioning
crises. Imperial propaganda, via the mass media, provides political
legitimacy and diplomatic backing, especially when client regimes engage
in gross human rights violations and high level corruption.
Conversely when attempting to weaken or overthrow a
nationalist-populist regime, the empire will resort to multiple forms of
attack including: [5]
(1) corruption (buying off government supporters), (2) funding and
organizing opposition media, parties, business and trade union
organizations, (3) organizing and backing disloyal military officials to
violently overthrow the elected government, (4) supporting employers’
lockouts to paralyze strategic sectors of the economy (oil),(5)
financing referendums and other ‘legal mechanisms’ to revoke democratic
mandates, (6) promoting paramilitary groups to destabilize civil
society, sow public insecurity and undermine agrarian reforms, (7)
financing electoral parties and non-governmental organizations to
compete in and delegitimize elections, (8) engaging diplomatic warfare
and efforts to prejudice regional relations and (9) establishing
military bases in neighboring countries, as a platform for future joint
military invasions.
The multi-prong, multi-track policies occur in sequence
or are combined, depending on the opportunities and results of earlier
tactical operations. For example, while financing the electoral
campaign of Capriles Radonski in April 2013, Washington also backed
violent post-election assaults by rightist thugs attempting to
destabilize the government in Caracas. [6]
Secretary of State John Kerry, while pursuing an apparent
effort to re-open diplomatic relations via negotiations, simultaneously
backed inflammatory declarations by Samantha Power, United Nations
representative, which promised aggressive US intrusion in Venezuela’s
domestic politics.
US-Venezuelan relations provide us with a case study that
illustrates how efforts to restore hegemonic politics can become an
obstacle to the development of normal relations, with an independent
country. In particular, the ascendancy of Washington during the ‘Golden
Age of Neo-liberalism’ in the 1990’s, established a fixed ‘mind set’
incapable of adapting to the changed circumstances of the 2000’s, a
period when the demise and discredit of ‘free market’ client politics
called for a change in US tactics. The rigidity, derived from past
success, led Washington to pursue ‘restoration politics’ under very
unfavorable circumstances, involving military, clandestine and other
illicit tactics with little chance of success – given the new situation.
The failure of the US to destabilize a democratically
elected nationalist popular regime in Venezuela occurred when Washington
was already heavily engaged in multiple, prolonged wars and conflicts
in several countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Libya).
This validates the hypothesis that even a global power is incapable of
waging warfare in multiple locations at the same time.
Given the shift in world market conditions, including the
increase in commodity prices, (especially energy), the relative
economic decline of the US and the rise of Asia, Washington lost a
strategic economic lever - market power – in the 2000’s, a resource
which it had possessed during the previous decade. [7]
Furthermore, with the shift in political power in the region and the
rise of popular-nationalist governments in most of Latin America,
Washington lost regional leverage to ‘encircle’, ‘boycott’ and intervene
in Venezuela. Even among its remaining clients, like Colombia,
Washington could do no more than create ‘border tensions’ rather than
mount a joint military attack.
Comparative historical analysis of the strategic changes
in international and regional politics, economies, markets and
alignments provides a useful framework for interpreting US-Venezuelan
relations, especially the successes of the 1990’s and the failures of
the 2000’s.
US-Venezuela Patron-Client Relations 1960’s -1998
During the 40-year period following the overthrow of the
Dictator Perez Jimenez (1958) and prior to the election of President
Hugo Chavez (1998), Venezuela’s politics were marked with rigid
conformity to US political and economic interests on all strategic
issues. [8]
Venezuelan regimes followed Washington’s lead in ousting Cuba from the
Organization of American States, breaking relations with Havana and
promoting a hemispheric blockade. Caracas followed Washington’s lead
during the cold War and backed its counter-insurgency policies in Latin
America. It opposed the democratic leftist regime in Chile under
President Salvador Allende, the nationalist governments of Brazil
(1961-64), Peru (1967-73), Bolivia (1968-71) and Ecuador (in the
1970’s). It supported the US invasions of the Dominican Republic,
Panama and Grenada. Venezuela’s nationalization of oil (1976) provided
lucrative compensation and generous service contracts with US oil
companies, a settlement far more generous than any comparable
arrangement in the Middle East or elsewhere in Latin America.
During the decade from the late 1980’s to 1998, Venezuela signed [9] off on draconic International Monetary Fund
programs, including privatizations of natural resources, devaluations
and austerity programs, which enriched the MNCs, emptied the Treasury
and impoverished the majority of wage and salary earners. [10]
In foreign policy, Venezuela aligned with the US, ignored new trade
opportunities in Latin America and Asia and moved to re-privatize its
oil, bauxite and other primary resource sectors. President Perez was
indicted in a massive corruption scandal. When implementation of the
brutal US-IMF austerity program led to a mass popular uprising (the
‘Caracazo’) in February 1989, the government responded with the massacre
of over a thousand protestors. The subsequent Caldera regime presided
over the triple scourge of triple digit inflation, 50% poverty rates and
double digit unemployment. [11]
Social and political conditions in Venezuela touched
bottom at the peak of US hegemony in the region, the ‘Golden Age of
Neo-Liberalism’ for Wall Street. The inverse relation was not casual:
Venezuela, under President Caldera, endured austerity programs and
adopted ‘open’ market and US-centered policies, which undermined any
public policies designed to revive the economy. Moreover, world market
conditions were unfavorable for Venezuela, as oil prices were low and
China had not yet become a world market power and alternative trade
partner.
US and the Rise of Chavez: 1998-2001
The US viewed the Venezuelan elections of 1998 as a
continuation of the previous decade, despite significant political signs
of changes. The two parties, which dominated and alternated in power,
the Christian democratic ‘COPEI’, and the social democratic ‘Democratic
Action Party’, were soundly defeated by a new political formation headed
by a former military officer, Hugo Chavez, who had led an armed
uprising six years earlier and had mounted a massive grass-roots
campaign, attracting radicals and revolutionaries, as well as
opportunists and defectors from the two major parties. [12]
Washington’s successes over the previous decade, the
entrenched ascendancy of neo-liberalism and the advance of a regional US
‘free trade agreement’ blinded the Clinton regime from seeing (1) the
economic crisis and discredit of the neo-liberal model, (2) the
deepening social and economic polarization and hostility to the IMF-USA
among broad sectors of the class structure and (3) the decay and
discredit of its client political parties and regimes. Washington
tended to write-off Chavez’s promises of a new constitutional order and
new ‘Bolivarian’ foreign and domestic policies, including
nationalist-populist reforms, as typical Latin American campaign
rhetoric. The general thinking at the US State Department was that
Chavez was engaging in electoral demagogy and that he would ‘come to his
senses’ after taking office. [13]
Moreover Washington’s Latin Americanists believed that the mix of
traditional politicians and technocrats in his motley coalition would
undermine any consequential push for leftist radical changes. [14]
Hence Washington, under Clinton, did not adopt a hostile
position during the first months of the Chavez government. The
watchword among the Clintonites was ‘wait and see’ counting on
long-standing ties to the major business associations, friendly military
officials, and corrupt trade union bosses and oil executives to check
or block any new radical initiatives emanating from Venezuelan Congress
or President Chavez. In other words, Washington counted on using the
permanent state apparatus in Caracas to counter the new electoral
regime.
Early on, President Chavez recognized the institutional
obstacles to his nationalist socio-economic reforms and immediately
called for constitutional changes, convoking elections for a constituent
assembly, which he won handily. Washington’s growing concerns over the
possible consequences of new elections were tempered by two factors:
(1) the mixed composition of the elected assembly (old line politicians,
moderate leftists, radicals and ‘unknowns’) and (2) the appointment of
‘moderates’ to the Central Bank as well as the orthodox economic
policies pursued by the finance and economic ministries. Prudent
budgets, fiscal deficits and balance of payments were at the top of
their agendas.
The new constitution included clauses favoring a radical
social and nationalist agenda. This led to the early defection of some
of the more conservative Chavez supporters who then aligned with
Washington, signaling the first overt signs of US opposition. Veteran
State Department officials debated whether the new radical constitution
would form the basis of a leftist government or whether it was standard
‘symbolic’ fare, i.e. rhetorical flourishes, to be heavily discounted,
from a populist president addressing a restive ‘Latin’ populace
suffering hard times but not likely to be followed by substantive
reforms. [15]
The hard liners in Caracas, linked to the exile Cuban community and
lobby argued that Chavez was a ‘closet’ radical preparing the way for
more radical ‘communist’ measures. [16]
In fact, Chavez policies were both moderate and radical: His political
‘zigzags’ reflected his efforts to navigate a moderate reform agenda,
without alienating the US and the business community on the one hand,
and while responding to his mass base among the impoverished slum
dwellers (rancheros’) who had elected him.
Strategically, Chavez succeeded in creating a strong
political institutional base in the legislature, civil administration
and military, which could (or would) approve and implement his
national-populist agenda. Unlike Chilean Socialist President Salvador
Allende, Hugo Chavez first consolidated his political and military base
of support and then proceeded to introduce socio-economic changes.
By the end of 2000, Washington moved to regroup its
internal client political forces into a formidable political opposition.
Chavez was too independent, not easily controlled, and most important
moving in the ‘wrong direction’ - away from a blind embrace of
neo-liberalism and US-centered regional integration. In other words,
while Chavez was still well within the parameters of US hegemony, the
direction he was taking portended a possible break.
The Turning Point: Chavez Defies the ‘War on Terror’ 2000-2001
The first decade of the new millennium was a tumultuous
period which played a major role in defining US-Venezuelan relations.
Several inter-related events polarized the hemisphere, weakened
Washington’s influence, undermined collaborator-client regimes and led
to a major confrontation with Venezuela.
First, the neo-liberal model fell into deep crisis
throughout the region, discrediting the US-backed clients in Bolivia,
Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil and elsewhere. Secondly, repeated major
popular uprisings occurred during the crisis and populist-nationalist
politicians came to power, rejecting US-IMF tutelage and US-centered
regional trade agreements. [17]
Thirdly, Washington launched a global ‘war on terror’, essentially an
offensive military strategy designed to overthrow adversaries to US
domination and establish Israeli regional supremacy in the Middle East.
In Latin American, Washington’s launch of the ‘war on terror’ occurred
precisely at the high point of crisis and popular rebellion, undermining
the US hope for region-wide support. Fourthly, beginning in 2003,
commodity prices skyrocketed, as China’s economy took off, creating
lucrative markets and stimulating high growth for the new left of center
regimes.
In this vortex of change, President Chavez rejected
Washington’s ‘War on Terror’, rejecting the logic of ‘fighting terror
with terror’. By the end of 2001, Washington dispatched a top State
Department official and regional ‘enforcer’ to Caracas where he bluntly
threatened dire reprisals – destabilization plans – if Caracas failed to
line up with Washington’s campaign to reimpose global hegemony. [18]
Chavez dismissed the official’s threats and re-aligned his nation with
the emerging Latin American nationalist-populist consensus. In other
words, Washington’s aggressive militarist posture backfired: polarizing
relations, increasing tensions and, to a degree, radicalizing
Venezuela’s foreign policy.
Washington’s intervention machine (the ‘coup-makers’)
went into high gear: Ambassador Charles Shapiro held several meetings
with the FEDECAMARAS (the Venezuelan business association) and the trade
union bosses of the CTV (Venezuelan Trade Union Confederation). [19]
The Pentagon and the US Southern Command met with their clients in the
Venezuelan military. The State Department increased contacts and
funding for opposition NGO’s and rightwing street gangs. The date of
the coup had been set for April 11, 2002. With the buildup of pressure,
preparatory for the threatened coup, the Chavez government began to
assess its own resources, contacting loyal military units, especially
among the armored battalions and paratroopers.
In this heated and dangerous atmosphere, local
neighborhood committees sprang up and mobilized the poor around a more
radical social agenda defending their government while the US-backed
opposition unleashed violent street clashes. [20] The coup was warmly welcomed by Washington and its semi-official mouthpiece, the New York Times, [21] as well as by the rightwing Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar [22].
The illicit coup regime seized President Chavez, dismissed Congress,
dissolved political parties and declared a state of emergency. The
masses and leading sectors of the military quickly responded in mass:
Millions of poor Venezuelans descended from the ‘ranchos’ (slums
surrounding Caracas) and gathered before Miraflores, the Presidential
Palace, demanding the return of their elected President - repudiating
the coup. The constitutionalist military, led by an elite paratroop
battalion, threatened a full-scale assault against the palace. The
coup-makers, realized they were politically isolated and outgunned; they
surrendered. Chavez returned to power in triumph. The traditional US
policy of violent regime change to restore its hegemony had been
defeated; important collaborator assets were forced into exile and
purged from the military.
Washington had played a risky card in its haste and lost on several
fronts: First of all, US support for the coup strengthened the
anti-imperialist sectors of Chavez’s Bolivarian movement. Chavez
discarded any residual illusions of ‘reaching an accommodation’ with
Washington. Secondly, the loss of key military assets weakened
Washington’s hope for a future military coup. Thirdly, the complicity
of the business groups weakened their ability to influence Chavez’s
economic policies and nudged him toward a more statist economic
strategy. Fourthly, the mass mobilization of the poor to restore
democracy moved the government to increase spending on social welfare
programs. Anti-imperialism, the demand for social welfare and the
threat to Venezuelan national security led Chavez to establish strategic
ties with Cuba, as a natural ally.
Washington’s escalation of aggression and overt
commitment to regime change altered the bilateral relationship into one
of permanent, unbridled hostility. Spurred on by its having supported a
failed coup, Washington resorted once again to ‘direct action’ by
backing a ‘boss’s lockout’ of the strategic oil industry. This was led
by ‘client assets’ among the executives and corrupt sectors of the
petroleum workers union.
Washington implemented its ‘global militarization’ of US
foreign policy. Under the subterfuge ‘War on Terror’ – a formula for
global intervention, which included the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001
and, the war against Iraq in 2003, imperial policymakers have plunged
ahead with new aggressive policies against Venezuela.
The pretext for aggression against Venezuela was not
directly linked to oil or Chavez’s appeal for Latin American
integration. The trigger was Chavez direct and forthright refusal to
submit to a militarist global US empire as demanded by President Bush –
one which conquered opponents by force and maintained a network of
collaborator vassal states. The oil conflicts – Chavez’ nationalization
of US oil concessions and his appeal for regional integration,
excluding the US and Canada, were a result of and in response to US
overt aggression. Prior to the US-backed April 2002 failed coup and the
oil-bosses’ lockout of December 2002 – February 2003, there were no
major conflicts between Chavez and US oil companies. Chavez’s
conception of the Bolivarian unity of all Latin American states was
still a ‘vision’ and not a concrete program for action. Chavez’s
takeover of US oil concessions was a defensive political move to
eliminate a powerful political adversary which controlled Venezuela’s
strategic export and revenue sectors. He did not intervene in European
oil companies. Likewise, Chavez’s move to promote regional
organizations flowed from his perception that Venezuela required closer
ties and supportive relations in Latin America in order to counter US
imperial aggression.
In other words, US empire builders used (and sacrificed)
their economic assets in their attempt to restore hegemony via military
means. The military and strategic dimensions of the US Empire took
precedence over ‘Big Oil’. This formed a template clearly evident in
all of its subsequent imperial actions against Iraq, Libya and Syria and
its severe economic sanctions against Iran. The same hegemonic
priorities played out in Washington’s intervention in Venezuela – but
failed.
Contrary to some theorists of imperialism, who have argued that imperialism expands via economic ‘dispossession’ [23],
recent history of US-Venezuela relations demonstrate that 21st US
imperialism grows via political intervention, military coups and by
converting economic collaborators into political agents willing to
sacrifice US corporate wealth to secure imperial military-political
domination.
The imperial policymakers decided to overthrow Chavez
because he had defied Washington and opposed Bush’s global military
strategy. The White House thought it had powerful assets in Venezuela:
the mass media, the two major opposition parties, the principle
business federation (FEDECAMARAS), the official trade union bureaucracy,
sectors of the military and the church hierarchy … Washington did not
count on the loyalty and affection that the unorganized masses and the
popular movements has for President Chavez. Nor did imperial
strategists understand that strategic military units, like the
paratroops, retained nationalist, personal and political ties with their
democratically-elected President.
Within 48 hours of the coup, Chavez was restored to power –
striking the first blow to Washington’s ambitions for ‘regime change’
in Venezuela. The second blow came with the defeat of the US-backed oil
bosses’ lockout. Washington had counted on its close ties with the
senior executives of the state oil company (PDVS) and the heads of the
oil workers union. [24]
Washington did not realize that about half of the oil workers and a
number of company and union bosses would staunchly opposed the lockout
while other Latin American oil producers would supply Venezuela and
break the ‘bosses’ strike.
These twin defeats, the military-business coup and the
bosses’ lockout, had a profound impact on US-Venezuelan relations. The
US lost its strategic internal assets – business and trade union elites
who then fled to ‘exile’ in Miami or resigned. Pro-US oil executives
were replaced by nationalists. Washington’s direct imperial intervention
pushed the Chavez government in a new, radical direction as it moved
decisively from conciliation to confrontation and opposition. The
government of Venezuela launched a radical, nationalist, populist agenda
and actively promoted Latin American integration. Venezuela
inaugurated UNASUR, ALBA and PetroCaribe, undermining the US-centered
free trade treaty (ALCA).
Washington’s military-interventionist strategy was
undermined by the loss of their key collaborators. The White House
switched to its clients in the opposition parties and, especially, to
so-called non-governmental organizations (NGOs) channeling funds via the
‘National Endowment for Democracy’ and other “front groups”. They
bankrolled a ‘recall referendum’, which was decisively defeated, further
demoralizing the rightwing electorate and weakening remaining US
clients. [25]
Having lost on the military, economic and electoral
fronts, Washington backed a boycott of Congressional elections by the
opposition parties- leading to the final debacle in its program to
de-legitimize and destabilize the Chavez government. Pro-Chavez
candidates and parties swept the election gaining an overwhelming
majority. They went on to approve all of the government’s
nationalist-social reform agenda. The US-backed opposition lost all
institutional leverage.
The US imperial failures from 2002-2005 did not merely
‘reflect’ mistaken policies; these signaled a more profound problem for
the empire - its inability to make an accurate estimate of the
correlation of forces. This strategic failure led it to continue
throwing its marginalized domestic assets into conflict with less
resources and support. Despite repeated defeats, Washington couldn’t
grasp that popular power and nationalist allegiances within the military
had successfully countered the US business-military intervention.
Political hubris underpinning a military-driven imperialist ideology had
blinded Washington to the realities in Venezuela, i.e. Hugo Chavez
possessed massive popular support and was backed by nationalist military
officers. Desperate for some political ‘victory’ in its conflict with
the government of Hugo Chavez, Washington staggered from one adventure
to another without reflecting on its lost assets or disappearing
opportunities. Washington did not understand the decisive political
shifts occurring in Latin America and favorable global economic
conditions for petroleum exporters. Organizing a ‘recall referendum’ in
the face of Venezuela’s double-digit growth, its radicalized population
and the booming world prices for oil, was the height of imperial
imbecility. [26]
Imperial Policy During the Commodity Boom 2004-2008
With virtually no collaborators of consequence,
Washington turned toward the ‘outside’ destabilization strategy using
its only loyal regional client, the death squad narco-President Alvaro
Uribe of Colombia. Bogota granted Washington the use of seven military
bases, numerous airfields and the establishment of Special Forces
missions- preparatory for cross border intrusions. The strategy would
be to launch a joint intervention under the pretext that Venezuela
supplied and sheltered the FARC guerillas.
World events intervened to thwart Washington’s plans: the
invasion of Iraq and the bloody occupation of Afghanistan, looming
conflicts with Iran and low intensity warfare in Somalia, Yemen and
Pakistan, had weakened the empire’s capacity to intervene militarily in
Venezuela. Every country in the region would have opposed any direct US
intervention and Colombia was not willing to go it alone, especially
with its own full-scale guerrilla war against the FARC.
Venezuela’s trade surplus and high export revenues
rendered the traditional Washington financial levers like the IMF and
World Bank impotent. [27]
Likewise, Venezuela had signed multi-billion dollar arms trade
agreements with Russia, undermining any US boycott. Trade agreements
with Brazil and Argentina reduced Venezuela’s need for US food imports.
All the oil multinationals continued normal operations in
Venezuela, except US companies. The government’s selective
nationalization program and gradual increases in taxes and royalty
payments undercut EU support for the US, given the high world price of
oil (exceeding $100 dollars a barrel). Chavez’s left-turn was
well-funded. The oil revenues funded a wide-range of social programs,
including subsidized food, housing and social welfare, healthcare and
educational programs led to a sharp drop in poverty and unemployment.
This secured a strong electoral base for Chavez. The ‘pivot to the
Middle East’, following Bush’s declaration of the ‘Global War on Terror,
bogged the US down in a series of prolonged wars, undermining its quest
to regain regional power. [28]
More significantly, the ‘Latin Americanists’ in the State
Department and Pentagon were stuck in the 1990’s paradigm of ‘free
markets and vassal states’ just when the most important countries in the
region had moved toward greater independence in terms of trade, greater
intra-regional integration and social inclusion. Unable to adapt to
these new regional realities, Washington witnessed the region’s
rejection of US-centered free trade accords. Meanwhile China was
displacing the US as the region’s main trading partner. [29]
Without its collaborator elites among the military to act as
‘coup-makers for empire’, the US-imperial reach shrunk. Coups failed in
Bolivia and Ecuador further radicalizing political relations against
the US.
Washington did not lack partners: New bilateral trade
agreements were signed with Chile, Panama, Colombia and Mexico. The
Pentagon engineered a bloody coup in Honduras against a democratically
elected President. The National Security Agency engaged in major
cyber-spying operations in Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and the rest of the
continent. [30]
The White House poured over six -billion dollars into Colombia’s armed
forces to serve as a proxy for the US military. These “gains” had
little impact. US support for the coup-makers in Honduras may have
overthrown an ally for Chavez in ALBA but it led to even greater
diplomatic isolation and discredit for Washington throughout Latin
America. Even Colombia denounced the US coup against the Honduran
president. While US military support for Colombia contributed to some
border tensions with Venezuela, the election of President Santos in
Bogota brought significant movement toward peaceful reconciliation with
Venezuela. Whereas trade between Colombia and Venezuela had fallen to
less than $2 billion dollar a year, with Santos’ conciliatory policy it
rose sharply to nearly $10 billion. [31]
Washington’s external strategy was in shambles. The
program of NSA cyber-spying against regional leaders, revealed by Edward
Snowden, resulted in outrage and greater animosity toward Washington.
The President of Brazil was especially incensed and cancelled a
scheduled major state White House visit and allocated $10 billion
dollars to set up a nationally controlled IT system. Imperial policy
makers had relied exclusively on interventionist strategies with
military-intelligence operations and were clearly out of touch with the
new configuration of power in Latin America. In contrast, Venezuela
consolidated its economic ties with the new regional and global economic
power centers, as the foundations for its independent policies.
Washington viewed President Chavez and, his successor
President Maduro’s regional strategy as a security threat to US hegemony
rather than an economic challenge. Venezuela’s success in forging
bilateral ties, even with US clients like Colombia and Mexico, and a
number of English-speaking Caribbean islands, undermined efforts to
‘encircle and isolate’ Venezuela. Caracas success in financing and
backing multi-lateral regional economic and political organizations in
South America and the Caribbean, which excluded the US, reflects the
power of oil diplomacy over saber rattling. Venezuela’s PetroCaribe
program won the support of number of neo-liberal and center-left regimes
in the Caribbean, which had previously been under US hegemony. In
exchange for subsidized oil prices, medical aid and interest-free loans,
these US clients started rejecting Washington’s intervention. ALBA
brought together several center-left governments, including Bolivia,
Ecuador and Nicaragua, into a common political bloc opposing US
meddling.
ALBA rejected regime change via coups throughout Latin
America and opposed Washington’s wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria and
elsewhere. Venezuela successfully joined the powerful economic bloc,
MERCOSUR, enhancing its trade with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.
Venezuela’s strategic alliance with Cuba (trading its oil for Cuba’s
medical services) made the massive Bolivarian health program for the
poor a great success, cementing Chavez and Maduros’ electoral base among
the Venezuelan masses. This undermined Washington’s well-funded program
of ‘NGO’ subversion in poor neighborhoods. Venezuela successfully
undercut Bush and Obama’s efforts to use Colombia as a ‘military proxy’
when it signed a historic peace and reconciliation agreement with
President Santos. Colombia agreed to end its cross-border paramilitary
and military incursions and withdrew its support for US destabilization
operations in exchange for Venezuela closing guerrilla sanctuaries,
re-opening trade relations and encouraging the FARC to enter into peace
negotiations with the Santos regime. [32]
Santos’ embrace of Venezuela’s trade and diplomatic ties eroded
Washington’s policy of using Colombia as a trampoline for military
intervention and forced imperial policy-makers to turn to its domestic
Venezuelan clients through elections as well as internal ‘direct
action’, e.g. the sabotage of power stations and the hoarding of
essential food and commodities.
While Washington’s imperial rhetoric constantly protrayed
Venezuela as a ‘security threat’ to the entire hemisphere, no other
country adopted that position. Latin America viewed Caracas as a
partner in regional trade integration and a lucrative market. US
diplomacy does not reflect its trade relations with Venezuela: only
Mexico is more dependent on the US oil market. However, Venezuela’s
dependence on the US to purchase its oil has been changing. In 2013
Venezuela signed a $20 billion dollar investment and trade deal with
China to extract and export ‘heavy oil’ from the Orinoco Basin.
Venezuela’s deep trade ties with the US are in sharp contrast with the
hostile diplomatic relations resulting in the mutual withdrawal of
ambassadors and Washington’s gross interference in Venezuelan elections
and other internal affairs. For example, in March 2013, two US military
attaches were expelled after they were caught trying to recruit
Venezuelan military officers. A few months later, in September, three
US Embassy officials were kicked out for their participation in
destabilization activity with members of the far right opposition. [33]
Imperialism’s Multi-Track Opposition
US hostility toward Venezuela occurs at three levels of
conflict: At the country-level, Venezuela marks out a new development
paradigm which features public ownership over the free market, social
welfare over multi-national oil profits and popular power over elite
rule. At the regional level Venezuela promotes Latin American
integration over US-centered Latin American Free Trade Agreements,
anti-imperialism over “pan-Americanism”, foreign aid based on reciprocal
economic interests and non-intervention as opposed to US military
pacts, narco-military collusion and military bases. [34]
At the global-level Venezuela has rejected the US
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, ignored US trade sanctions against
Iran, opposed Washington and NATO’s bombing of Libya and the proxy
invasion of Syria. Venezuela condemns Israel’s colonization and
annexation of Palestine. In other words, Venezuela upholds national
self-determination against US military driven imperialism. [35]
Presidents Chavez and Maduro have presented a successful
alternative to neo-liberalism. Venezuela demonstrates that a highly
globalized, trade dependent economy can have an advanced welfare
program. The US, on the other hand, as it ‘globalizes’, has been
eliminating its domestic social welfare programs in order to finance
imperial wars. Venezuela has shown the US public that a market economy
and large social welfare investments are not incompatible. This
paradigm flies in the face of the White House’s message. Moreover, US
Empire builders have no economic initiatives compete with Venezuela’s
regional and global alliances. This situation is very different from
the 1960’s when President Kennedy proposed the ‘Alliance for Progress’,
involving trade, aid and reforms, to counter the revolutionary appeal of
the Cuban revolution. [36]
Presidents Bush and Obama could only ‘offer’ costly military and
police co-operation and worn-out neo-liberal clichés accompanied by
market constraints.
Despite its severe diplomatic setbacks, regional
isolation, the loss of its military platform, and an economic boom,
driven by the high world price of oil, Washington keeps on trying to
destabilize Venezuela. Beginning in 2007, imperial strategy re-focused
on elections and domestic destabilization programs. Washington’s first
success occurred when it backed a campaign against new constitutional
amendments in December 2007 defeating Chavez by 1%. This happened right
after his substantial Presidential re-election victory. The overtly
socialist constitution proved too radical for a sector of the Venezuelan
electorate. [37]
Since 2008 Washington has infused large sums of money
into a variety of political assets, including NGOs and middle class
university students’ organization engaged in agitation and anti-Chavez
street demonstrations. [38]
The goal was to exploit local grievances. US funding of domestic
proxies led to extra-parliamentary, destabilization activity, like
sabotage, disrupting Venezuela’s economy while blaming the government
for ‘public insecurity’ and covering up opposition violence.
The business community started hoarding essential goods
in order to provoke shortages and whip up popular discontent. The
opposition media blamed the shortages on state ‘inefficiency’.
Opposition political parties started receiving significant US funding,
on condition that they unified and ran on a single slate in contesting
elections and questioned the legitimacy of the election results
(claiming ‘fraud’) after their defeat.
In summary, US efforts to restore its hegemony in Caracas
involved a wide range of domestic clients from violent paramilitary
groups, NGO’s, political parties, elected officials and manufacturing
and commercial executives linked to the production and distribution of
essential consumer goods.
The shifts in Washington’s policies, from internal
violence (coup of 2002, oil lockout of 2002-03), and cross border
military threats from Colombia (2004-2006), returning to internal
domestic elections and campaigns of economic sabotage reflects recent
attempts to overcome failed policies without surrendering the strategic
objective of restoring hegemony via overthrowing the elected government
(“regime change” in the imperial lexicon).
Seven Keys to Imperial Politics: An Overview
Washington’s effort to restore hegemony and reimpose a
client regime in Caracas has last over a decade and involves the
empire’s capacity to achieve seven strategic goals:
1.) Imperial capacity to overthrow a nationalist government
requires a unified collaborator military command. President Chavez made
sure there were loyalists in strategic military units able to counter
the coup-making capacity of imperial proxies.
2.) Imperial capacity to intervene depends on not being tied
down in ongoing wars elsewhere and on securing regional collaborators.
Neither condition was present. The armies of the empire were bogged
down in prolonged wars in the Middle East and South Asia creating public
hostility to another war in Venezuela. The plans to convert Colombia
into an ally in an invasion of Venezuela failed because Colombia’s
business elite were already shouldering significant trade losses due to
the cross-border skirmishes and Washington had little or nothing in
economic compensation or alternative markets to offer Colombian
exporters and most of US “aid” (Plan Colombia) involved direct military
transfers and sales – useless to domestic producers.
3.) The imperial destabilization campaign wasted its strategic
assets through premature, ill-calculated and high-risk operations where
one failure seemed to lead to even higher risk interventions in an
effort to cover-up Washington’s bankrupt strategy. The US-backed coup
of 2002 was clearly based on poor intelligence and a grotesque
underestimation of President Chavez’s support among the military and the
masses. Washington did not understand how Chavez’s astute
institutional changes, in particular his promotion of loyalist sectors
of the armed forces, undercut the capacity of its domestic
collaborators. Blinded by its racist and ideological blinders,
Washington counted on its business allies and trade union bureaucrats to
‘turn-out the crowds’ to back the junta and provide a legal cover. In
the face of serious losses resulting from the subsequent purging of
client elites in the military and business associations, Washington then
unleashed its client oil executives and trade union officials to mount
an oil lockout, without any support from the military. Eventually the
shutdown of oil production and delivery managed to alienate broad
sectors of the business community and consumers as they suffer from fuel
and other critical shortages. In the end, over ten thousand US clients
among senior and middle management were purged and the PDVSA (the state
oil company) was restructured and transformed into a formidable
political instrument funding Venezuela comprehensive social welfare
programs.
Increases in social spending in turn boosted Chavez’s
support among voters and consolidated his mass base among the poor.
Imperial strategists switched from failing to overthrow Chavez by
extra-parliamentary tactics to launching an unsuccessful referendum and
suffered a decisive and demoralizing defeat in the face of strong
popular for Chavez’ social initiatives. To make a virtue of its serial
disasters, Washington decided to backed a boycott of the Congressional
elections and ended up with near unanimous Chavista control of Congress
and a wide popular mandate to implement Chavez executive prerogatives.
Chavez then used his executive decrees to promote an anti-imperialist
foreign policy with no congressional opposition!
4.) The US’ ill-timed ideological warfare (both the
‘neo-liberal’ and ‘war on terror’ variants) was launched against
Venezuela from 2001 on - just when revolts, uprisings and collaborator
‘regime change’ were occurring throughout Latin America. The
continent-wide rebellion against US-centered free-market regimes
resonated with Chavez’s nationalist-populism. Washington’s ideological
appeals flopped... Its blind, dogmatic embrace of a failed development
strategy and the continued embrace of hated clients ensured that
Washington’s ideological war against Venezuela would boomerang: instead
of isolating and encircling Venezuela, there was greater Latin American
regional solidarity with the Bolivarian regime. Washington found
itself isolated. Instead of dumping discredited clients and attempting
to adapt to the changing anti-neo-liberal climate, Washington, for
internal reasons (the ascent of Wall Street), persisted in pursuing a
self-defeating propaganda war.
5.) Imperial efforts to reassert hegemony required an economic
crisis, including low world demand and prices for Venezuela’s
commodities, declining incomes and employment, severe balance of
payment problems and fiscal deficits – the usual mix for destabilizing
targeted regimes. None of these conditions existed in Venezuela. On
the contrary, world demand and prices for oil boomed. Venezuela grew by
double-digits. Unemployment and poverty sharply declined. Easy and
available consumer credit and increased public spending greatly expanded
the domestic market. Free health and education and public housing
programs grew exponentially. In other words, global macro-economic and
local social conditions favored the anti-hegemonic perspectives of the
government. US and clients’ efforts to demonize Chavez flopped. Instead
of embracing popular programs and focusing on the problems of their
implementation and mismanagement, Washington embraced local political
collaborators who were identified with the deep socio-economic crisis of
the ‘lost decade’ (1989-1999) – the period of real misery for the
Venezuelan masses prior to Chavez ascent to power. Imperial critics in
Latin America easily refuted Washington’s attacks on the Chavez
development model by citing favorable employment, income, purchasing
power and living standards compared to the previous neoliberal period. [39]
6.) Imperial policy makers were way out of step in Latin America,
emphasizing its brand of global ideological-military confrontation
while leaders and public opinion in Latin America were turning toward
growing market opportunities for their commodities. The ‘War on
Terror’, Washington’s hobby-horse for global supremacy, had minimum
support among the people of Latin America. Instead, China’s demand for
Latin American commodities displaced the US as the major market their
exports. In this context, global militarism was not going to restore US
hegemony; Latin American leaders were focused on domestic and Asian
markets, poverty reduction, democracy and citizen participation. During
past decades, when Latin America was ruled by military regimes, US
global militarism resonated with the elites. Washington’s attempt to
restore an earlier model military-client rule by backing the coup in
Honduras was denounced throughout the continent, not only by center-left
governments, but even by conservative civilian regimes, fearful of a
return to military rule at their expense.
7.) The change from a Republican to a Democratic presidency in
Washington did not result in any substantive change in imperial policy
toward Venezuela or Latin America. It only led to the serving up of
‘double discourse’ as President Obama touted a ‘new beginning’, ‘new
overtures’ and ‘our shared values’. In practice, Washington continued
military provocations from its bases in Colombia, backed the Honduras
military coup and supported a violent destabilization campaign in April
2013 following the defeat of its favored presidential candidate,
Henrique Capriles Radonski, by the Chavista Nicholas Maduro. The Obama
regime stood isolated throughout the hemisphere (and the OECD) when it
refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Maduro’s election victory. In
imperial countries, political changes from a liberal to a conservative
executive, (or vice versa), does not in any way affect the deep imperial
state, its military interests or strategies. President Obama’s resort
to the ‘double discourse, to talk diplomatically and act militarily, as
a mode of hegemonic rule quickly lost its luster and effectiveness even
among centrist-post-neo-liberal leaders.
Imperialism is not simply a ‘policy’ it is a structure. It has a
powerful military aid component dependent on strategically placed
collaborators and supporters in targeted countries and operating in a
favorable (crisis-ridden) environment. Imperialism flourishes when its
military and diplomatic approach serves economic interest benefiting
both the ‘home market’ and local collaborators. In the second decade of
the 21st century, the dominance of ‘military-driven imperialism’ bled
the domestic economy, destroying and impoverishing the targeted society
and shattering living standards. The recent devastating wars in the
Middle East have dismantled entire societies and weakened US-client
elites.
Latin American and Venezuelan development-oriented leaders took
a long look at the destruction wrought by US policy elsewhere and
turned to new partners - the newly emerging economic powers with growing
markets. These new partners, like China, pursue economic ties, which
are not accompanied by military and security threats of intervention.
Chinese investments do not include military missions and massive spy
networks, like the CIA, DEA, and NSA, posing threats to national
sovereignty.
The Imperial Dynamic and the Radicalization of Venezuelan Politics
Imperial intervention can have multiple and contrasting
effects: It can intimidate a nationalist government and force it to
renege on its electoral promises and revert to a liberal agenda. It can
lead to an accommodation to imperial foreign policies and force a
progressive government to moderate domestic reforms. It can lead to
concessions to imperial interests, including military bases, as well as
concessions to extractive capital, including the dispossession of local
producers, to facilitate capital accumulation. Covert or overt
intervention can also radicalize a moderate reformist government and
force it to adopt anti-imperialist and socialist measures as defensive
strategy. Over time incremental changes can become the basis for a
pro-active radical leftist agenda.
The range of systemic responses illustrates the analytical
weakness of the so-called ‘center-periphery’ framework, which lumps
together: a) disparate political, social and economic internal
configurations, b) opposing strategies and responses to imperialism and
c) complex international relations between imperial and nationalist
regimes. The polar opposite responses and political-economic
configurations of the US and China (so-called ‘centers’) to Venezuela
further illustrates the lack of analytical utility of the so-called
‘world system’ approach in comparison with a class-anchored framework.
The imperial dynamic, the drive by Washington to reassert
hegemony in Venezuela by violent regime change, had the unintended
consequence of radicalizing Chavez’ policies, consolidating power and
furthering the spread of anti-imperialist programs throughout the
region. [40]
In the first years of the Chavez government, 1999-2001, Venezuela
pursued largely orthodox policies and sought friendly relations with
Washington, while espousing a Bolivarian vision. In this period, Chavez
did not implement his vision. He did not try to set up any regional
organizations that excluded the US.
Nevertheless, Washington retained its ties to the opposition
and sought to influence a motley collection of opportunist politicos who
had jumped on the Chavez bandwagon while countering the leftists in the
coalition government.
The first big break in this Caracas-Washington peaceful
co-existence was caused by the Bush Administration’s big push for global
power via the so-called ‘War on Terror’ doctrine. Its demand that
Chavez support the military offensives against Afghanistan and Iraq or
face retaliation provoked the break. Chavez resisted and adopted the
position that the ‘War on Terror’ violated international law. In other
words, Venezuela upheld traditional international norms just when
Washington had turned to global military extremism. Washington
perceived Chavez’s policy as a grave threat, an example for other
‘recalcitrant’ states within Latin America and across the globe to
follow in resisting the US bullying. This led to an overt warning from
the US State Department that “he (Chavez) would pay a price” for not
submitting to the US global military offensive. [41]
Washington immediately started to implement plans to overthrow the
Chavez government leading to the bloody, but unsuccessful coup of April
2002. If the trigger for US imperial intervention was Chavez lawful
opposition to Washington’s global military strategy, the defeat of the
coup and his restoration to power, led a re-definition of Venezuelan-US
relations. Bilateral relations went from co-existence to confrontation.
Venezuela began looking for regional allies, actively supporting left
and nationalist movements and governments in Latin America.
Simultaneously it pursued relations with imperial rivals and
adversaries, including Russia, China, Belarus and Iran. Washington
launched its second effort to unseat Chavez by backing the oil bosses’
lockout – severely damaging the economy. The defeat and purge of the
US-backed PDVS oil executives led to the radicalization of social policy
in Venezuela, with the vast reallocation of oil revenues to working
class-based social programs. Chavez appointed nationalists to key
economic ministries, selectively nationalizing some enterprises and
declaring a radical agrarian reform program, which included the
expropriation of un-cultivated land. In part, the radical policies were
‘pragmatic’, defensive measures in pursuit of national security. They
also were in response to the support for the Bolivarian government from
the newly mobilized urban and rural poor. Radicalization was also a
response to pressures from the nationalist and socialist elements in the
newly formed Socialist Party and allied trade union confederations. US
imperial efforts to isolate Venezuela in the hemisphere, copying the
1960’s ‘blockade of Cuba’ failed. There was a region-wide trend in line
with Venezuela: nationalist populist and leftist movements and
coalition governments were replacing US client regimes. Washington’s
policy backfired by regionalizing the conflict under unfavorable
conditions: Venezuela gained popularity and support while Washington was
isolated, leading to the demise of its plan for a regional free trade
agreement.
The threat from the US pushed Chavez to re-define the nature of
the political process from ‘reform’ to ‘revolution’; from moderate
nationalism to 21st century socialism; from a bilateral conflict to a
regional confrontation. Venezuela sponsored and promoted several key
alliances including ALBA and PetroCaribe; Chavez later broadened
Venezuela’s regional ties to include UNASUR and MERCOSUR.
Venezuela’s radical rejection of US hegemony was, however,
tempered by structural limitations which provided US empire builders and
internal clients with access points to power. The ‘socialization’
program did not affect 80% of the economy. Banking, foreign trade,
manufacturing and agriculture remained under private ownership. Over
95% of the public watched programs from a domestic mass media owned by
US-backed private clients. [42]
Transport, food distributors and supermarkets remained privately
owned. Campaigns and elections remained vulnerable to foreign funding
by the National Endowment for Democracy and other US conduits. While
the mixed economy and open electoral system, secured approval from Latin
America’s center-left regimes and neutralized some of the hostile US
propaganda, they also allowed the empire to use its local collaborators
to commit sabotage, hoard vital consumer goods and create shortages,
stage violent street confrontations during elections and permitted the
mass media openly call for insurrection.
The dialectic confrontation between US imperial aggression and
Venezuelan nationalism deepened the revolution and spread its appeal
overseas. Venezuela’s successful defiance of US imperialism became the
defining reality in Latin America.
Imperialism, based on militarism and regime destabilization,
led Venezuela to begin a process of transition to a post neo-liberal,
post-capitalist economy rooted in regional organizations. Yet this
process continued to reflect economic realities from the capitalist
past. The US remained Venezuela’s most important petroleum market. The
US, caught up in Middle-East wars and sanctions against oil producers
(Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria) was not willing to jeopardize its
Venezuelan oil imports via a boycott. Necessity imposed constraints on
even imperial aggression as well as Venezuela’s ‘anti-imperialism’.
Conclusion
US-Venezuela relations provide a casebook study of the complex,
structural and contingent dimensions of imperialism and
anti-imperialism. Contemporary US empire building, with its global
engagement in prolonged serial wars and deteriorating domestic economy,
has witnessed a sharp decline in its capacity to intervene and restore
hegemonic influence in Latin America. Throughout Latin America,
Venezuela’s success in resisting imperial threats, demonstrates how much
imperial power is contingent on local client regimes and collaborator
military elites to sustain imperial hegemony. The entire process of
imperial capital accumulation through direct exploitation and
‘dispossession’ is based on securing control over the state, which, in
turn, is contingent on defeating anti-imperialist and nationalist
governments and movements. Imperialist hegemony can be based on either
electoral processes (‘democracy’) or result from coups, lockouts and
other anti-democratic, authoritarian mechanisms. While, historically,
economic interests are an important consideration of imperial
policymakers, contemporary US imperialism has confronted emerging
nationalist governments because of their rejection of its ‘global war’
ideology. In other words Venezuela’s rejection of the ideology and
practice of offensive wars and violations of international law is the
trigger that set in motion imperial intervention. Subsequent conflicts
between Washington and Caracas over oil company expropriations and
compensation were derived from the larger conflict resulting from US
imperial militarism. US oil companies had become economic pawns and not
the subjects of imperialist policymakers.
US imperialist relations in Latin America have changed
dramatically in line with the internal changes in class relations. US
financial and militarist elites, not industrial-manufacturers, now
dictate policy. The relocation of US manufacturers to Asia and elsewhere
has been accompanied by the ascendancy of a power configuration whose
political pivot is in the Middle East and, in particular, in their own
words, ‘securing Israel’s superiority in the region’. This has had two
opposing effects: On the one hand it has led imperial policymakers to
pursue non-economic militarist agendas in Latin America and, on the
other, to ‘neglect’ or allocate few resources, investments and attention
to cultivating clients in Latin America. Inadvertently, the ‘Middle
East pivot’ and the militarist definition of reality has allowed Latin
America to secure a far greater degree of independence and greater scope
for cultivating diverse economic partners in the 21st century than was
possible for the greater part of the 20th century.
Have US-Latin American relations permanently changed? Has
Venezuela consolidated its independence and achieved the definitive
defeat of imperial intervention? It would be premature to draw firm
conclusions despite the substantial victories achieved during the first
decade and a half of the 21st century.
Pro-US regimes and elites still wield influence throughout
Latin America. As was evident in the Presidential elections in Venezuela
in April 2013, the US-funded opposition candidate, Henrique Capriles,
came within 2% of winning the election. And Washington, true to its
vocation to destabilize, has refused to recognize the legitimacy of the
election. Since then several officials of the US Embassy have been
implicated in plots to overthrow the Maduro government. The ongoing,
intrusive imperial cyber-spying system under the US National Security
Agency introduces a new element in colonial intervention reaching into
the highest political and economic spheres in the entire region,
incurring the wrath of Brazil, the largest country in Latin America.
Unrepentant, Washington has affirmed its right to colonize and dominate
Brazilians and Venezuelan cyber-space and control all communications
between strategic elites.
Obama’s affirmation of the US ‘right to spy’ prompted new
anti-imperialist measures, including proposals to end ties to US-based
and controlled information networks. In other words, new imperial
methods of colonization based on new technologies triggers new
anti-imperial responses, at least for independent states.
The anti-neoliberal governments in Latin America, heading up
the struggle against US hegemony, face serious challenges resulting from
the continuing presence of private banking and finance groups, US based
multi-nationals and their local collaborators in the political parties.
Except for Venezuela and Bolivia, on-going US-Latin American joint
military programs provide opportunities for imperial penetration and
recruitment.
The high dependence of Venezuela and the other center-left
countries (Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, etc.) on commodity
exports (agriculture, minerals and energy) exposes the vulnerability of
their finances and development and social welfare programs to
fluctuations and sharp downturns in global export revenues. [43]
So far world demand for Latin American commodities has fueled
growth and independence and weakened domestic support for military
coups. But can the mega-cycles continue for another decade? This is
especially important for Venezuela, which has not succeeded on
diversifying its economy with oil still accounting for over 80% of its
export earnings. The China trade, which is growing geometrically, has
been based on exports of raw materials and imports of finished goods.
This reinforces neocolonial economic tendencies within Latin America.
Intra-Latin American trade (greater regional integration) is
growing and internal markets are expanding. But without changes in
class relations, domestic and regional consumer demand cannot become the
motor force for a definitive break with imperialist-dominated markets.
In the face of a second world economic crisis, the US may be forced to
reduce its global military operations, but will it return to hemispheric
dominance? If commodity demand drops and the Chinese economy slows, do
post-neoliberal regimes have alternative economic strategies to sustain
their independence?
Imperial power in Latin America and in Venezuela in particular,
has suffered serious setbacks but the private property power structures
are intact and imperial strategies remain. If the past half-century
offers any lessons, it is that imperialism can adapt different political
strategies but is never surrenders its drive for political, military
and economic domination.
Political Chronology of Venezuela
December 1998: Chavez elected
1999: Three referendums all successful: to establish constituent assembly to draft new constitution; to elect membership of constituent assembly; to approve new constitution.
July 2000: ‘Mega-election’: to elect President, national legislators and state and municipal officials. Chavez wins 6 year term with approx. 60% of the popular vote, his Patriotic Pole coalition wins 14 of 23 governorships and majority of seats in National Assembly
April 2002: Failed US backed military-civilian coup
December2, 2002 – Feb. 4, 2003: Failed oil executive and businessmen lockout to topple Chavez government.
August 2004: Recall referendum which Chavez wins by substantial margin
December 2005: Legislative elections: opposition boycotts, results in Chavez supporters dominating the National Assembly.
December 2006: Chavez re-elected with approx. 63% of the popular vote
December 2007: Chavez constitutional amendment package (‘21st Century Socialism’) narrowly defeated in national referendum
2008: Chavez moves to unite supporters into a single party – the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
November 2008: State and municipal elections: pro-Chavez candidates won 17 of 22 governors’ races and 80% of more than 300 mayoral races
January 2009: National Assembly votes to hold referendum on constitutional amendment to abolish terms limits for all elected government officials.
February 2009: Referendum approved 55% to 45%.
September 2010: National Assembly elections, Chavez supporters won 98 seats (94 for PSUV candidates) versus 87 seats for opposition parties (65 won by 10 opposition parties known as Democratic United Platform/MUD). But the Government failed to win enough seats to enact various part of government agenda such as approving constitutional reforms.
October 2012 Presidential elections: Chavez wins with approx. 55% of popular vote.
December 2012: State and municipal elections, PSUV sweeps to victory.
April 2013: Chavez successor Nicholas Maduro wins election by 51% to 49%.
[1]
Steve Ellner Rethinking Venezuelan Politics: Class, Conflict and the
Chavez Phenomenon (Lynn Reiner: Boulder, Colorado (2009)
[2] James Petras, “US-Latin American Relations: Ruptures, Reaction and Illusions of Times Past”, JPetras LaHaine, 11/2/06
[3] World Development Reports (World Book: 1991-2001) Washington D.C., IMF Staff Country Report No 98/117, October 1998, Washington, DC
[4] James Petras, “Rethinking Imperialist Theory”, JPetrasLaHaine, 12/21/2010
[5] James Petras, “US-Venezuelan Relations: Imperialism and Revolution”, JPetrasLaHaine, 1/5/2010. Eva Golinger, The Chavez Code: Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela (Olive Branch Press 2006).
[6] James Petras, “Venezuelan Elections: A Choice and Not an Echo”, JPetrasLaHaine, 10/4/12 and “Beyond President Chavez Electoral Victory: Socialism in a Rentier State”, JPetrasLaHaine, 10/26/2013.
[7] James Petras, “Networks of Empire and Realignments of World Power”, JPetrasLaHaine, 1/2/2011; Financial Times 4/26/2011, Special Supplement “Latin America: New Trade Routes”
[8] Richard Gott, Hugo Chavez: The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela (Verso: London 2005). Gregory Wilpert, Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government (Verso: London 2007).
[9] James Petras et al, The Nationalization of Venezuelan Oil (Praeger: New York 1977).
[10] IMF Staff Country Reports, No. 98/17, October 1998.
[11] World Bank Country Report: 2000. (Washington DC 2001)
[12] Ellner opcit and Wilpert op.cit.
[13] Interviews State Department, November 2009
[14] Ibid
[15] Interviews State Department, January 2001
[16] Ibid
[17] James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Social Movements in Latin America; Neo-Liberalism and Popular Resistance (New York: Palgrave/MacMillan 2013).
[18] Interview with President Chavez, January 20, 2002
[19] Eva Golinger, Bush versus Chavez (New York: Monthly Review Press 2007)
[20] George Ciccariello Maher, We Created Chavez: A Peoples History of the Venezuelan Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press 2013).
[21] New York Times, April 12, 2002, page 1
[22] El Mundo (Madrid) April 12, 2002, page 1
[23] David Harvey, The New Imperialism (London Oxford Press 2005)
[24] Ellner op.cit.; Wilpert op.cit.
[25] Eva Golinger, The Chavez Code, ibid
[26] Ellner op.cit.
[27] In 2008 5the Chavez government broke ties with the IMF and World Bank. Interview official Venezuelan Foreign Office, November 2008
[28] Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval: The Venezuelan Economy in the Chavez Years. (Center for Economics and Policy) Washington D.C. 2008; National Institute of Statistics cites the reduction of extreme poverty of over 50%, a decline from 5.4 million Venezuelans in 1998 to 2.4 million in 2011.
[29] James Petras, “Networks of Empire and Realignments of World Power”, JPetrasLaHaine, 1/2/11. Financial Times “China is now Regions Biggest Partner”, Special Report, 4/26/2011 and page 4.
[30] La Jornada, September 30, 2013.
[31] James Petras, “Chavez Right-turn: State Realism versus International Solidarity”, JPetrasLaHaine, 6/13/2011
[32] James Petras, “President Chavez and the FARC: State and Revolution”, JPetrasLaHaine, 7/3/2008
[33] La Jornada, September 30, 2013.
[34] Interview President Chavez Caracas, November 7, 2006
[35] Ibid.
[36] James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, Latin America: Reform or Revolution, (New York Fawcett 1968)
[37] Gregory Wilpert, “An Assessment of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution at Twelve Years”, Venezuelanalysis.com, 2/2/2011
[38] Eva Golinger “Documents Reveal Multimillion-dollar Funding to Journalists and Media in Venezuela”, HTTP://chavezcode.com/2010/07/documebts-4reveal-multimilliion-dollar.html
[39] Weisbrot and Sandoval, opcit
[40] George Ciccariello-Maher, We Created Chavez, opcit. Steve Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Policies, op.cit.
[41] Interview Foreign Affairs official, Caracas, November 6, 2006
[42] “Private Opposition TV Continues to Dominate in Venezuela”, Center for Economy ad Policy Research: Washington D.C., 12/13/2010.
[43] “Beyond President Chavez Electoral Victory” Socialism in a Rentier State”, JPetrasLaHaine, 10/26/12; G. Wilpert, “An Assessment …”, op. cit.
[2] James Petras, “US-Latin American Relations: Ruptures, Reaction and Illusions of Times Past”, JPetras LaHaine, 11/2/06
[3] World Development Reports (World Book: 1991-2001) Washington D.C., IMF Staff Country Report No 98/117, October 1998, Washington, DC
[4] James Petras, “Rethinking Imperialist Theory”, JPetrasLaHaine, 12/21/2010
[5] James Petras, “US-Venezuelan Relations: Imperialism and Revolution”, JPetrasLaHaine, 1/5/2010. Eva Golinger, The Chavez Code: Cracking US Intervention in Venezuela (Olive Branch Press 2006).
[6] James Petras, “Venezuelan Elections: A Choice and Not an Echo”, JPetrasLaHaine, 10/4/12 and “Beyond President Chavez Electoral Victory: Socialism in a Rentier State”, JPetrasLaHaine, 10/26/2013.
[7] James Petras, “Networks of Empire and Realignments of World Power”, JPetrasLaHaine, 1/2/2011; Financial Times 4/26/2011, Special Supplement “Latin America: New Trade Routes”
[8] Richard Gott, Hugo Chavez: The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela (Verso: London 2005). Gregory Wilpert, Changing Venezuela by Taking Power: The History and Policies of the Chavez Government (Verso: London 2007).
[9] James Petras et al, The Nationalization of Venezuelan Oil (Praeger: New York 1977).
[10] IMF Staff Country Reports, No. 98/17, October 1998.
[11] World Bank Country Report: 2000. (Washington DC 2001)
[12] Ellner opcit and Wilpert op.cit.
[13] Interviews State Department, November 2009
[14] Ibid
[15] Interviews State Department, January 2001
[16] Ibid
[17] James Petras and Henry Veltmeyer, Social Movements in Latin America; Neo-Liberalism and Popular Resistance (New York: Palgrave/MacMillan 2013).
[18] Interview with President Chavez, January 20, 2002
[19] Eva Golinger, Bush versus Chavez (New York: Monthly Review Press 2007)
[20] George Ciccariello Maher, We Created Chavez: A Peoples History of the Venezuelan Revolution (Durham: Duke University Press 2013).
[21] New York Times, April 12, 2002, page 1
[22] El Mundo (Madrid) April 12, 2002, page 1
[23] David Harvey, The New Imperialism (London Oxford Press 2005)
[24] Ellner op.cit.; Wilpert op.cit.
[25] Eva Golinger, The Chavez Code, ibid
[26] Ellner op.cit.
[27] In 2008 5the Chavez government broke ties with the IMF and World Bank. Interview official Venezuelan Foreign Office, November 2008
[28] Mark Weisbrot and Luis Sandoval: The Venezuelan Economy in the Chavez Years. (Center for Economics and Policy) Washington D.C. 2008; National Institute of Statistics cites the reduction of extreme poverty of over 50%, a decline from 5.4 million Venezuelans in 1998 to 2.4 million in 2011.
[29] James Petras, “Networks of Empire and Realignments of World Power”, JPetrasLaHaine, 1/2/11. Financial Times “China is now Regions Biggest Partner”, Special Report, 4/26/2011 and page 4.
[30] La Jornada, September 30, 2013.
[31] James Petras, “Chavez Right-turn: State Realism versus International Solidarity”, JPetrasLaHaine, 6/13/2011
[32] James Petras, “President Chavez and the FARC: State and Revolution”, JPetrasLaHaine, 7/3/2008
[33] La Jornada, September 30, 2013.
[34] Interview President Chavez Caracas, November 7, 2006
[35] Ibid.
[36] James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, Latin America: Reform or Revolution, (New York Fawcett 1968)
[37] Gregory Wilpert, “An Assessment of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution at Twelve Years”, Venezuelanalysis.com, 2/2/2011
[38] Eva Golinger “Documents Reveal Multimillion-dollar Funding to Journalists and Media in Venezuela”, HTTP://chavezcode.com/2010/07/documebts-4reveal-multimilliion-dollar.html
[39] Weisbrot and Sandoval, opcit
[40] George Ciccariello-Maher, We Created Chavez, opcit. Steve Ellner, Rethinking Venezuelan Policies, op.cit.
[41] Interview Foreign Affairs official, Caracas, November 6, 2006
[42] “Private Opposition TV Continues to Dominate in Venezuela”, Center for Economy ad Policy Research: Washington D.C., 12/13/2010.
[43] “Beyond President Chavez Electoral Victory” Socialism in a Rentier State”, JPetrasLaHaine, 10/26/12; G. Wilpert, “An Assessment …”, op. cit.
James Petras
Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York. His latest published work is The Arab Revolt and the Imperialist Counter Attack, (Clarity Press, March 2011).
Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York. His latest published work is The Arab Revolt and the Imperialist Counter Attack, (Clarity Press, March 2011).
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